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LANDLORD AND TENANT NOTICES
CORNEIJUS J. PFCKt
Introductory Note: The following article was prepared for the use of
students taking the course in landlord and tenant law. In the hope
that it may be of some use to practitioners in this state, it is reproduced
here. For the convenience of the reader, the provisions of RCW
59.04.020 and a portion of the unlawful detainer statute, RCW
59.12.030, are set out below.*
Most of the problems with regard to the sufficiency of landlord and
tenant notices arise under the provisions of the unlawful detainer
statute now found in RCW 59.12.030, and it is with this statute that
most of the discussion in this article will be concerned. However, refer-
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington.
* RCW 59.04.020 Tenancy from month to month-Termination. When premises
are rented for an indefinite time, with monthly or other periodic rent reserved, the
tenancy is a tenancy from month to month, or from period to period on which rent is
payable, and may be terminated by written notice of thirty days or more, preceding the
end of any month or period, given by either party to the other. [Code 1881 § 2054;
RRS § 10619.]
RCW 59.12.030 Unlawful detainer defined. A tenant of real property for a term
less than life is guilty of unlawful detainer either:
(1) When he holds over or continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of
the property or any part thereof after the expiration of the term for which it is let to
him. When real property is leased for a specified term or period by expess or implied
contract, whether written or oral, the tenancy shall be terminated without notice at the
expiration of the specified term or period;(2) When he, having leased property for an indefinite time with monthly or other
periodic rent reserved, continues in possession thereof, in person or by subtenant, after
the end of any such month or period, when the landlord, more than twenty days prior
to the end of such month or period, has served notice (in manner in RCW 59.12.040
provided) requiring him to quit the premises at the expiration of such month or period;(3) When he continues in possession in person or by subtenant after a default in
the payment of rent and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the pay-
ment of the rent or the surrender of the detained premises, served (in manner in RCW
59.12.040 provided) in behalf of the person entitled to the rent upon the person owing
it, has remained uncomplied with for the period of three days after service thereof.
The notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes due;(4) When he continues in possession in person or by subtenant after a neglect or
failure to keep or perform any other condition or covenant of the lease or agreement
under which the property is held, including any covenant not to assign or sublet, than
one for the payment of rent, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the
performance of such condition or covenant or the surrender of the property, served (in
manner in RCW 59.12.040 provided) upon him, and if there is a subtenant in actual
possession of the premises, also upon such subtenant, shall remain uncomplied with for
ten days after service thereof. Within ten days after the service of such notice the
tenant, or any subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, or any mortgagee of the
term, or other person interested in its continuance, may perform such condition for
covenant and thereby save the lease from such forfeiture;(5) When he commits or permits waste upon the demised premises, or when he sets
up or carries on thereon any unlawful business, or when he erects, suffers, permits, or
maintains on or about the premises any nuisance, and remains in possession after the
service (in manner in RCW 59.12.040 provided) upon him for three days' notice quit; or
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ences to cases arising under other statutory provisions will be made in
order to give a more complete account of the law applicable to such
notices.
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington has said that a sub-
stantial compliance with the requirements of the unlawful detainer
statute should be sufficient for the form or contents of a notice served
under that statute.' However, other decisions make it apparent that
certain formal provisions are either necessary, or at least a wise drafts-
man's precaution against litigation. Proof of compliance with the
notice provisions of the unlawful detainer statute is necessary as an
element of a cause of action under the statute.2 Indeed, the language
of the supreme court in one case" suggests that failure to offer such
proof may constitute a jurisdictional defense in the sense that the
point might be raised for the first time on appeal, but an earlier deci-
sion4 clearly states that a court's jurisdiction in an unlawful detainer
proceeding does not depend upon the service of an adequate notice
and that such service is merely a fact, like others, which must be
proved at the trial.
At the outset it should be noted that while notice is necessary to
make a tenant guilty of unlawful detainer under the other subsections
of RCW 59.12.030, such is not the case where a tenant holds over after
the expiration of a lease for a specified term. The first subsection of
RCW 59.12.030, which provides that a tenant is guilty of unlawful
detainer when he holds over after the expiration of a specified term,
also specifically provides that such a tenancy shall terminate without
notice at the end of the term or period. Accordingly, it has been held
the requirements of notice are inapplicable in an unlawful detainer
proceeding brought against a tenant holding over after the expiration
of a lease for a specified period.5 Of course, if the landlord accepts rent
for an additional period after the expiration of a specified term without
an agreement that the additional letting is only for that specified
period, a periodic tenancy will be created.6 Thereupon the notice
(6) A person who, without the permission of the owner and without having color of
title thereto, enters upon land of another and who fails or refuses to remove therefrom
after three days' notice, in writing, is served upon him in the manner provided in RCW
59.12.040. [1953 c 106 § 1. Prior: 1905 c86 § 1; 1891 c96 § 3; RRS § 812.]
1 Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Thrower, 155 Wash. 613, 285 Pac. 654 (1930).2 Woodward v. Blanchett, 36 Wn.2d 27, 31, 216 P2d 228 (1950) ; Davis v. Palmer,
39 Wn2d 222, 235 P-2d 151 (1951).
3 Davis v. Palmer, supra, note 2.
" State ex rel. Robertson v. Superior Court, 95 Wash. 447, 448-449, 164 Pac. 63
(1917), (cited in the Davis case, siupra).
5 Stanford Land Co. v. Steidle, 28 Wash. 72, 68 Pac. 178 (1902).6 Worthington v. Moreland MotorTruck Co., 140 Wash. 528, 531-532, 250 Pac. 30
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requirements for periodic tenancies will become applicable.
Notices served by either landlords or tenants should, of course, be
in writing. RCW 59.04.020, which is the provision governing the
termination of periodic tenancies by tenants, specifically provides
for "written notice of thirty days or more." Landlords who for some
reason desire to use ejectment rather than the unlawul detainer statute
to remove a tenant holding under a periodic tenancy should also satisfy
the requirements of this provision. However, landlords more frequently
use the speedier procedure of unlawful detainer proceedings.
It is true that the notice requirements in the various subdivisions of
the unlawful detainer statute, RCW 59.12.030, vary as to the express
requirement of written notice. Thus subdivision 2, which relates to
the termination of a periodic tenancy, and subdivision 5, which relates
to the commission of waste, the carrying on of unlawful business, or
the maintenance of a nuisance, use only the term "notices" On the
other hand, subdivision 3, which relates to default in payment of rent,
subdivision 4, which relates to failure to keep or perform a condition
or covenant of the lease, and subdivision 6, which relates to parties
entering without permission or color of title, all specify "notice in
writing." But all of the subdivisions (except the first, discussed above)
require service in the manner provided in RCW 59.12.040, the terms
of which clearly contemplate only written notice.
An exception to the requirement that notices by a landlord to
terminate periodic tenancies be in writing would appear to exist in
cases involving leases of agricultural land for yearly periods. In
McDonald v. Potts,7 the tenant held under what apparently was a
tenancy from year to year for an indefinite time, or a periodic tenancy
of yearly periods. The tenant's contention that the notices served
upon him were insufficient to terminate the tenancy because they were
not given as required under the unlawful detainer statute, now RCW
59.12.030 (2), was rejected. The court held that notice given under
the provision governing holding over on agricultural land, now RCW
59.04.060, was sufficient. Other decisions of the court make it clear
that an oral notice is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of that
(1926); Wilson v. Barnes, 134 Wash. 108, 110-112, 234 Pac. 1029 (1925); Lowman v.
Russell, 133 Wash. 10, 12, 233 Pac. 9 (1925). See Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Hansen & Rowland Corp., 166 F.2d 258, 262 (9th Cir., 1948). To be effective, such
agreement probably must be written. Cf. Armstrong v. Burkett, 104 Wash. 476, 177
Pac. 333 (1918) ; cf. also Najewitz v. Seattle, 21 Wn2d 656, 152 P.2d 722 (1944). But
sce RCW 59.04.030.
7 132 Wash. 59, 231 Pac. 164 (1924).
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provision.' The reason given is that such a notice is not designed for
the purpose of terminating a tenancy but for the purpose of prevent-
ing the commencement of a new tenancy which would otherwise arise
under RCW 59.04.060 if the tenant held over without notice for more
than 60 days after the expiration of the old tenancy. The cases
holding oral notice sufficient appear to be correct. The fact that
the oral notice thus given is authorized by a provision which the
code revisors have placed under the sub-chapter dealing with ten-
ancies rather than a provision in the sub-chapter dealing with unlawul
detainer should not preclude a landlord from utilizing the procedures
now set forth in the unlawful detainer sub-chapter. The provision
governing holding over on agricultural land was section 4 of the Act
of 189, 9 from wtich the sub-chapter on unlawful detainer, RCW
59.12, was derived. Compliance with the notice requirements of the
provision should be sufficient to qualify a landlord to utilize the pro-
cedures set up by the same Act. In effect, after such an oral notice has
been given, the landlord is in a position to bring his proceeding under
the first subdivision of the unlawful detainer statute, in which case no
further notice is necessary.
Another exception to the requirement of written notice by the land-
lord would appear to exist in those rare cases involving tenancies at
will. In Najewitz v. Seattle,"0 there was no allegation of a service of
written notice, but the court found no difficulty in holding that the
tenancy at will there involved was terminated upon demand for sur-
render of the land and that the tenant was entitled only to a reasonable
time thereafter within which to vacate. Of course, if the landlord elects
to terminate a tenancy at will upon oral notice, it is difficult to see how
his action could be brought as an unlawful detainer action under any
of the subdivisions of RCW 59.12.030, unless a tenancy at will is
forced into the category of a tenancy for a term under the first subdivi-
sion. Probably the landlord would be required to show that the tenant
retained the premises by force, or by menace and threat of violence,
bringing his case under the forcible detainer provision of RCW
59.12.020 (1)," or to bring an action for ejectment. 2
8 Smeltzer v. Webb, 101 Wash. 568, 172 Pac. 750 (1918) ; Mounts v. Goranson, 29
Wash. 261, 69 Pac. 740 (1902). See Hinkhouse v. Wacker, 112 Wash. 253, 258, 191
Pac. 881 (1920).
9 Session Laws, 1891, c. 96 §4.
10 21 Wn.2d 656, 152 P.2d 722 (1944).
11 See also the last clause of RCW 59.12.140.
12 Cf. Petsch v. Williams, 29 Wn.2d 136, 185 P.2d 992 (1947).
1s Shaffer v. Walther, 38 Wn.2d 786, 794, 232 P.2d 94 (1951) ; Wilson v. Barnes, 134
Wash. 108, 114, 234 Pac. 1029 (1925).
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Though these exceptions may be interesting, a return to the more
usual problems of landlord and tenant notices seems in order. Among
the most common are those notices given to terminate periodic ten-
ancies. Subsection 2 of RCW 59.12.030 provides that a tenant under
a monthly or periodic tenancy is guilty of unlawful detainer when he
continues to hold over if, more than 20 days prior to the expiration of
a month or period, he has been served with notice requiring him to quit
the premises at the expiration of that month or period. The provision
is, of course, inconsistent with the provision of the Code of 1881 now
found in RCW 59.04.020, which states that a tenancy for an indefinite
time, with monthly or periodic rent reserved, may be terminated by
written notice of 30 days or more preceding the end of any month or
period. It is clear, however, that for actions brought by a landlord
under the unlawful detainer provisions of RCW 59.12.030 only the
described notice of more than 20 days need be given."
The case of Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Thrower,4 raises
some questions in this area. In that case the landlord served a notice
to pay rent or quit within three days. The jury returned a verdict for
the landlord, finding that the landlord was entitled to the property
and that there was due as rent the sum of $265. However, the trial
judge sustained a motion for a new trial unless the landlord waived
the $265 awarded. This the landlord did. The supreme court affirmed,
and the landlord thus obtained possession of the premises in a pro-
ceeding initiated on a notice of default in payment of rent in which
the judgment finally entered awarded nothing for rent past due. The
possibility that the court considered the notice good as one to terminate
a periodic tenancy even though no rent was in fact due is strength-
ened by the statement,"5 "Since tenancy from month to month was
shown to exist, it can be terminated by the statutory notice before
the end of any month." If this was the basis of the decision, it would
appear to have been erronenous. A notice to pay rent or surrender is
premature and ineffective if served when the tenant is not in default, 6
and a tenant notified to pay rent or quit is certainly not notified that
even though the rent has been paid in full the landlord desires to
terminate the tenancy. The tenant might properly await receipt of
the proper statutory notice of the landlord's decision to terminate the
tenancy for other reasons.
14155 Wash. 613, 285 Pac. 654 (1930).
15 155 Wash. at 616.
28 Bernard v. Triangle Music Co., 1 Wn.2d 41, 95 P.2d 43, 126 A.L.R. 558 (1939).
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As indicated above, a tenant desiring to terminate such a periodic
tenancy is required to give at least 30 days notice prior to the end of
the month or period.'
7
A notice to terminate a tenancy given by a landlord, whether for
failure to pay rent, breach of a covenant, commission of waste, or
merely to terminate a periodic tenancy, should state the date upon
which the tenancy will be terminated and the tenant must vacate. In
Metcalfe v. Heslop,'8 a notice to pay rent or surrender the premises
was held defective because, among other reasons, it failed to fix a time
for the surrender of the premises in case of a continued failure to pay
the rent.'9 With regard to a notice to terminate a periodic tenancy at
the end of the period, the court had occasion to point out in Harris v.
Halverson," that the statute does not require that the notice specify
the time at which the tenant must vacate, but requires only that notice
be served more than 20 days prior to the expiration of the tenancy.
The statute does, however, provide for a "notice * * * requiring him
(the tenant) to quit the premises at the expiration of such month or
period," and it would seem to follow that the notice should not be
ambiguous as to which month or period is the one at the expiration of
which the tenant shall quit the premises.
In the Harris case the court held that a notice to terminate a periodic
tenancy was not defective because it required the tenant to vacate on
or before the first day of the next rent period rather than the last day
of the existing period. The same result was reached in Lowman v.
Russell,2' and the diligence of counsel has also produced a decision
that a notice to terminate a periodic tenancy is not defective if it
requires a tenant to vacate on or before the last day of the existing
period rather than the first day of the next period."
The requirements for written notices to terminate periodic tenancies
given by tenants under RCW 59.04.020 may be less stringent than
those imposed for notices given by landlords under the statute. In
Worthington v. Moreland Motor Truck Co.,2 3 the tenant under a
periodic tenancy vacated the premises on November 1st and on the
same day sent a letter with the keys to the landlord. The letter stated
'1 Worthington v. Moreland Motor Truck Co., 140 Wash. 528, 532, 250 Pac. 30(1926).Is 161 Wash. 106, at 107, 296 Pac. 151 (1931).
19 Cf. Davis v. Jones, 15 Wn2d 572, at 576, 131 P.2d 430 (1942).
20 23 Wash. 779, 785, 63 Pac. 549 (1901).
21133 Wash. 10, 12, 233 Pac. 9 (1925).22 Newman v. Worthen, 57 Wash. 467, at 470, 107 Pac. 188 (1910).
23 140 Wash. 528, 250 Pac. 30 (1926).
[SPRING
LANDLORD AND TENANT NOTICES
that the landlord might take possession as of that date. The letter
was not received by the landlord until the third or fourth of the month,
and the court accordingly held that it was insufficient to terminate the
tenancy on November 30th, because it had not been received more
than 30 days prior to that date. The court held, however, that it was
sufficient notice to terminate the tenancy as of December 31st. It
specifically reserved the question of whether such a notice served by
a landlord would be sufficient in view of the fact that it did not fix a
time when the tenancy would be terminated.
Although these cases suggest that a distinction might be drawn
between different types of notices given by landlords and between
notices given by landlords and notices given by tenants, it would
seem a wise precaution to insert in every notice the date upon which
the tenancy will be terminated or the premises surrendered. In cases
involving th termination of a periodic tenancy it would seem best to
set the date for termination and surrender as on or before the last
day of the final period of tenancy. To set the date as the day of the
beginning of the next period is, in the language of Harris v. Halverson,"
the "giving of an additional day" more than necessary. In cases involv-
ing notices under other subdivisions of RCW 59.12.030, such as notices
to pay rent or surrender, to perform a condition or covenant of a lease
or surrender, or to quit because of the commission of waste or the
conducting of an unlawful business or nuisance, the date for termina-
tion or surrender can be set in the statutory language, as for example,
"within three days (or ten days) after the service of this notice."25
Few cases appear to have arisen concerning the manner in which
time is computed for notice purposes. In McGinnis v. Genss,26 the
landlord served notice on January 11th to terminate a month to month
tenancy at the end of that month. The tenant contended that the
notice was insufficient because the service was just twenty days prior
to the end of the month, rather than "more than twenty days" as
required by the statute. The court held the notice sufficient saying,2 7
"Including the day of service and excluding the last day of the month,
there would be at the end of the month of January twenty days. * * *
The word 'more' does not add any additional time to the twenty days,
24 Supra, note 20.
25 See, e.g. Davis v. Jones, 15 Wn.2d 572, 575, 131 P2d 430 (1942) ; Erz v. Reese,
157 Wash. 32, 33, 288 Pac. 255 (1930) ; Metcalf v. Heslop, 161 Wash. 106, 108, 296
Pac. 151 (1931) ; Boyd v. North, 114 Wash. 540, 542, 195 Pac. 1011 (1921) ; Conmer-
cial Waterway Dist. v. Larson, 26 Wn.2d 219, 220, 173 P.2d 531 (1946).
'1025 Wash. 490, 65 Pac. 755 (1901).
27 25 Wash. at 491.
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but merely designates the complete expiration of that number of days."
In Ferguson v. Hoshi 8 a similar contention was rejected. While the
court's opinion in the Ferguson case only makes reference to the
previous decision in the McGinnis case, a headnote to the decision states
the rule for computation of time in a more usual fashion: "... it is
sufficient to give twenty days' notice prior to the end of the month or
period, excluding the day of service." Although the formula for com-
putation of time is differently stated in the two cases, it is apparent
that to terminate a periodic tenancy under RCW 59.12.030 (2) twenty
full days must elapse between the service of the notice and the expira-
tion of the tenancy. To be effective, notice must be served at the latest
at some time on the twenty-first day before the expiration of the period.
The statutory requirement of "more than twenty days" is satisfied if,
excluding the date of service, 20 full days remain before the expiration
of the designated period.
The case of Woodling v. Sawyer 9 provides additional information
concerning the computation of time for notice purposes. In that case
the landlord served a notice to pay rent or surrender on April 9th.
The tenants failed to pay the rent. The court held that the period of
their unlawful detainer did not begin until April 13th. From this it
may be inferred that the court did not count the day of service in
determining what would constitute the statutory three day period
of RCW 59.12.030 (3), and likewise that partial calendar days will
not be added together to make up the statutory period. The decision
would appear to be applicable to determination of statutory periods
under the other subdivisions of RCW 59.12.030, and hence of import-
ance in determining the time after notice during which a tenant may
avoid a forfeiture by performing a covenant of the lease as well as the
time during which a tender of the rent due will prevent a termination
of the tenancy.
A notice should contain an adequate description of the premises
involved. In Metcalfe v. Heslop, 0 the complaint alleged that the
defendant was the lessee of a building known as the Metz Apartments
situated on lots two and three, block eleven, J. J. McGilvra's Third
Addition to the City of Seattle. However, the notice served upon the
tenant to pay rent or surrender was addressed only, "Mrs. E. Marie
Heslop, Metz Apartments" and contained no further description of
the property. The notice was held insufficient because, among other
2825 Wash. 664, 66 Pac. 105 (1901).
29 38 Wn.2d 381, 229 P2d 535 (1951).
so 161 Wash. 106, 296 Pac. 151 (1931).
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things, it did not describe the property adequately. The inadequacy
of the description may, of course, have been merely one of the factors
which led to the conclusion that the notice was insufficient when con-
sidered with the other important defects of the notice. The inference
that this is so is strengthened by consideration of the descriptions of
the property in the notices held sufficient in other cases.3 As those
cases suggest, the crucial test should be whether the tenant was misled
by the inadequacy of the description. Though that may be the rule
which the court should follow in deciding litigated cases, it is obviously
not the rule to follow as a draftsman, and it is probably wise to insert
in such a notice the legal description of the property, such as would
be used in a lease or deed, in addition to the common description of
the premises.
As mentioned above, one of the facts relied on in holding defective
a notice to pay rent or surrender in Metcalfe v. Heslop,32 was the fact
that the notice failed to state the amount of the rent due. The same
reason was given, among others, in holding a similar notice defective
in Byrkett v. Gardner.3  Accordingly, the careful draftsman prepar-
ing a notice to pay rent or surrender will insert in the notice a demand
for the exact amount of rent due. A less carefully drafted notice may
be effective if it is sufficiently definite to enable the tenant to make a
tender of the claimed amount and avoid a forfeiture." Thus, in Erz v.
Reese, the notice stated that the tenant was "in default in the pay-
ment of rent, which matured and became payable upon the first day
of several months last past, and particularly of the rent which matured
and became payable upon the first day of December, 1928, and the
first day of January, 1929, the total of which defaulted rental now
aggregates a little over the sum of eight hundred dollars.. .' The
court held the notice barely sufficient, saying the tenant would have
been justified in tendering the minimum of $800, if that was the
amount due, thereby avoiding a forfeiture. In Ralph v. Lomer35 which
involved a notice given under what is now RCW 59.04.040, rather than
the unlawful detainer provisions of RCW 59.12.030, the notice did
not state the amount of rent due, but did state that it was the rent
31 Davis v. Jones, supra, note 19; Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Thrower, supra,
note 1. See also Erz v. Reese, supra, note 25.
32 161 Wash. 106, 296 Pac. 151 (1931).
33 35 Wash. 668, 676, 77 Pac. 1049 (1904).
04 Erz v. Reese, 157 Wash. 32, 35, 228 Pac. 255 (1930) ; Ralph v. Lomer, 3 Wash.
401, 407, 28 Pac. 760 (1891) ; see also Byrkett v. Gardner, supra, note 33.




due on the first day of February. The notice was held sufficient in view
of the facts that there was no controversy as to the amount due and
that the tenant made a late tender of the correct amount. The deci-
sion was later cited in Erz v. Reese," and therefore would seem to be
authority for the notice requirements of the unlawful detainer statute.
In Olson Land Co. v. Alki Park Co." a notice stating the months for
which rent was due without a computation of the total amount due was
likewise held sufficient on the basis of the decision in Ralph v. Lomer.
The results in a number of cases create some confusion, but they
are probably explainable as oversights induced by the failure of counsel
to argue the point. Thus, as mentioned above, in Provident Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Thrower" the court affirmed a judgment awarding
restitution of the premises to the landlord who had demanded the pay-
ment of $430 as rent past due, even though the verdict returned by
the jury was for only $265 and the judgment entered by the trial court
gave nothing for rent due. In Davis v. Jones' the court, without
discussing the effect of an excessive demand, affirmed a judgment in
favor of the landlord upon facts indicating that at the time of the
service of the notice the amount of rent actually due was only $32
whereas the notice demanded the payment of $339.50 as delinquent
rent. In another case,"' judgment for the landlord in an unlawful
detainer action was affirmed where the notice included a demand for
rent actually due to the landlord's grantor rather than to the landlord-
plaintiff. In Walker v. Myers 2 the court also awarded restitution of
the premises to a landlord who had overstated the amount of the rent
due in a notice to pay rent or surrender.
If, as the cases considering the point indicate, the test is whether the
tenant was prejudiced by the failure to state the amount of rent due
or by an incorrect statement of the amount due, it would seem that
an understatement of the amount of rent due should not make the notice
defective. In such a case the tenant is able to avoid a forfeiture by
making a timely tender of the amount demanded. Though the pay-
ment of that amount might not preclude the landlord from recovering
the additional amount of rent actually due, it would be a complete
defense to an unlawful detainer proceeding based on that notice.
Where the amount demanded is excessive but the tenant is in default,
37 Ibid.
38 63 Wash. 521, 115 Pac. 1083 (1911).
89 155 Wash. 613, 285 Pac. 654 (1930).
40 15 Wn2d 572, 131 P2d 430 (1942).
41 Kneeland Inv. Co. v. Aldrich, 63 Wash. 609, 116 Pac. 264 (1911).
42 166 Wash. 392, 7 P.2d 21 (1932).
[SPRING
LANDLORD AND TENANT NOTICES
the cases discussed above indicate that notice will be considered defec-
tive, at least where the tenant has a good faith doubt as to whether any
rent was due and would otherwise be placed in the position of tender-
ing an amount which he did not believe to be due upon the penalty of
forfeiture if any amount were found owing. The drastic consequences
of a forfeiture indicate the propriety of limiting the landlord's right
of action to situations in which he correctly informed the tenant of
the amount due, or at least did not prejudice the tenant in his deter-
mination of whether the notice was valid and to be obeyed. Of course,
if the landlord has correctly stated the amount due the tenant's good
faith is immaterial.
The number of cases in which the tenant has a good faith doubt
as to whether any rent is due or is prejudiced by an excessive demand
are probably few. The tenant is ordinarily in as good a position as the
landlord to compute the amount of rent due. If the tenant admits that
a certain amount is due and fails to tender even that after notice of
the landlord's intention to terminate for default in rent, it is difficult
to see how he has been prejudiced by the fact that the landlord asserted
that a greater amount was due, or why the landlord should be com-
pelled to begin again to declare a forfeiture for the non-payment of
rent which the tenant admits is due and has already failed to pay.
Notices under RCW 59.12.030 (4) to terminate a tenancy for failure
to keep or perform a condition or covenant of the lease must allege
with particularity the acts or failures to act upon which the lessor bases
his decision to terminate. It is not sufficient merely to notify the
tenant which conditions or covenants the lessor believes have not been
kept or performed; reference must be made to the specific acts or
omissions constituting the breach. The reason for requiring such
particularity is to give the tenant an opportunity to remedy the acts
and correct or suply the omissions during the 10-day period granted
by the statute for that purpose. 3
Thus, a notice to terminate the lease because of a breach of a
covenant to cultivate the land in a farmerlike manner was held insuffi-
cient when it did not supply the details as to what acts or omissions
constituted such a breach." Another notice to terminate was held
defective where the only allegations concerning various defaults fol-
43 Woodward v. Blanchett, 36 Wn2d 27, at 31, 216 P2d 228 (1950) ; Thisius v. Sea-
lander, 26 Wn2d 810, at 815, 175 P.2d 619 (1946) ; Byrkett v. Gardner, 35 Wash. 668,
674-675, 77 Pac. 1048 (1904).
44 Woodward v. Blanchett, .ipra, note 43.
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lowed the wording of the lease very closely. 5 Likewise, a notice con-
taining a general recital of the conditions and covenants of the lease,
followed by the statement that the lessee had failed to keep "each
and all" of such conditions and covenants was held insufficient because
it did not state the facts constituting such a breach or inform the
tenant of what he might do to avoid a forfeiture. 8
The same degree of particularity may not be necessary for notices
served under subdivision 5 of RCW 59.12.030, requiring a tenant to
vacate because he has committed or permitted waste, set up an unlaw-
ful business, or suffered or permitted a nuisance on the premises. The
reason for requiring such particularity in notices involving breaches of
conditions of covenants is, as indicated above, that they must be suffi-
cient to inform the tenant what things he must do to avoid the for-
feiture. No such alternative is given a tenant who has committed
waste, etc., and that need for particularity would therefore not exist.
However, since the double damages for unlawful detainer may impose
a substantial liability on the tenant, he may be entitled to a notice
sufficiently definite to enable him to form a judgment as to his legal
position if he decides to remain in possession. Certainly a landlord
should not be the beneficiary of double damages if he has misled a
tenant into believing he may safely remain in possession because
the acts relied on by the landlord do not constitute waste, etc. Accord-
ingly, it is probably a wise precaution to give as much detail as
possible in such a notice, coupled with general allegations in the
language of the statute.
Although there are no cases requiring that it be done, it is probably
wise to include in all notices a statement of which sub-sections of
the unlawful detainer statute are relied upon by the landlord. Such
a provision furnishes additional notice to the tenant of the nature of
the remedy asserted by the landlord, and its inclusion may be helpful
in sustaining the effectiveness of an otherwise doubtful notice.4 7
Notices addressed to tenants should be signed by the landlord or
in the landlord's name by an agent, rather than by the agent in his
own name, although signature in the agent's name only will not render
the notice defective if the lessee knows of the agency and is not misled
by the form of the signature."
45 Thisuis v. Sealander, supra, note 43.
48 Byrkett v. Gardner, supra, note 43. For an example of a notice alleging in detail
the facts constituting the breach of conditions and covenants in a lease, see the notice
served by the lessor in Wilson v. Daniels, 31 Wn.2d 633, at 638, 198 P.2d 496 (1948).
47 Cf. Erz v. Reese, supra, note 25.4 8 Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Thrower, 155 Wash. 613, at 617, 285 Pac. 654
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At this point it might also be noted that Hinkhouse v. Wacker,49
which involved a lease of community property invalid because, among
other things, it had not been signed by the wife, a notice signed by the
husband alone was held sufficient to prevent the commencement of
a new tenancy under RCW 59.04.060 by holding over an agricultural
land for more than 60 days. The court did not discuss the effect of the
failure of the wife to sign the notice, and, as pointed out above, such
notices involve an exception to the general rules governing landlord
and tenant notices. There appear to be no cases directly dealing with
the question of the necessity of both spouse's signatures on landlord
and tenant notices concerning leases of community property. Though
the husband's authority as manager of the community property should
be sufficient to sustain such notices when given as landlord, even over
the opposition of his wife, the obvious course of action for the careful
draftsman is to provide for signature by both or in both names by
their agent.
Where the tenants of the leased property are man and wife, the
notice should be directed to and served on both. In Metcalfe v. Heslop,
and Hinkhouse v. Wacker" notices served on only the wife were held
insufficient. The court's discussion of the problem in the Hinkkouse52
case, suggests that it considered the husband to be the only person
entitled to the service, but the statement in the Metcalfe case, 3 that
the notice "was insufficient, as the same is directed to one of the
respondents only" also suggests that the reason for holding that notice
insufficient was not that it was served on the wife only but that it was
not served on both spouses. Moreover, since the wife's signature to a
lease of premises occupied by the husband and wife as lessees is
unnecessary to bind the community, 4 there is a danger of a holding
that her signature was added so that the husband and wife could hold
as tenants in common rather than as a community. The doubt created
is sufficient to indicate the course to follow, though the results of litiga-
tion probably would be that service on the husband alone was suffi-
cient. The court has said that the husband's right as manager of the
community to decide the question of relinquishment of a lease cannot
(1930) ; cf. Bond v. Chapman, 34 Wash. 606, 76 Pac. 97 (1904) ; Bowman v. Harrison,
59 Wash. 56, 57, 109 Pac. 192 (1910).
-1 112 Wash. 253, 191 Pac. 881 (1920).
ro 161 Wash. 106, 107, 296 Pac. 151 (1931).
53 112 Wash. 253, 257, 191 Pac. 881 (1920).
52112 Wash. at 257.
S161Wash. at 107.
54 Monroe v. Stayt, 57 Wash. 592, 107 Pac. 517, 30 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1102 (1910).
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be defeated by the acts of the wife. 5 Moreover, the husband has the
same right to assign and transfer a lease as he has to dispose of chattels
generally, without the consent of his wife," and it would seem that
notices directed to and served on him alone, which give him the option
to pay rent, or to keep and perform conditions and covenants, or to
surrender the lease interest, should be sufficient as coming within his
power to dispose of the lease.5" By analogy, the other notice require-
ments of the unlawful detainer statute should be satisfied by service
on the husband alone.
With regard to the service of unlawful detainer notices by a landlord
generally it may be noted that if service is not made by delivering a
copy personally to the person entitled thereto, care should be taken to
fulfill all of the requirements of the alternative forms of service of
RCW 59.12.040. The tenant has a right to stand upon proof of the
exact service required by the statute. 8 Partial compliance with the
requirements of the alternative forms of service will not be sufficient,
as, for example, where a copy of the notice is left at the premises with a
person of suitable age and discretion but no copy is sent by mail ad-
dressed to the person entitled thereto at his place of residence.
Some cases suggest that the parties to the lease may make other pro-
visions for the giving of notices which will be effective even though they
differ from the provisions of the unlawful detainer statute. Thus, in
Skaffer v. Walther80 the court restated the instruction given by the trial
court to the effect that the parties could orally agree upon some other
method of terminating the tenancy and that such method would be
binding upon the parties. But the supreme court did not pass on the
correctness of the instruction, and the trial court may have intended to
state no more than that a tenant under a periodic tenancy who has
agreed to vacate on a certain day and thus led his landlord to believe
that written notice to terminate was unnecessary could waive his right
to written notice. Likewise, in Ralph v. Lomer,18 the court mentioned
that the tenant had, by the terms of the lease, waived notice and agreed
that the landlord might reenter without notice upon failure to pay rent,
thereby indicating that such an agreement would be valid. But the
55 Gabrielson v. Swinburne, 184 Wash. 242, at 247, 51 P2d 368 (1935).
56 Tibbals v. Iffland, 10 Wash. 451, at 457, 39 Pac. 102 (1895).
57 Cf. Halvorsen v. Pacific County, 22 Wn.2d 532, 156 P.2d 907 (1945).
58 See O'Connell v. Arai, 63 Wash. 280, 282-283, 115 Pac. 95 (1911) ; Lowman v.
West, 8 Wash. 355, 359, 36 Pac. 258 (1894).59 Hinkhouse v. Wacker, supra, note 8; cf. Smith v. Seattle Camp No. 69 W.O.W., 57
Wash. 556, 107 Pac. 372 (1910). See Harris v. Halverson, 23 Wash. 779, 787, 63 Pac.
549 (1901).60 38 Wn.2d 786, 794, 232 P2d 94 (1946).
613 Wash. 401, 408, 28 Pac. 760 (1891).
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court also held that the notice given by the landlord was sufficient, and,
more important, the case did not arise under the present unlawful de-
tainer statute. Such provisions may be valid if the landlord seeks to
recover possession of the premises in an ejectment proceeding, 2 al-
though they would provide no justification for repossession by force
without legal proceedings. 3 An entirely different question arises,
however, if the landlord attempts to utilize the procedures of the
unlawful detainer statute.
Where the landlord seeks to recover possession of the premises
under the unlawful detainer statue, RCW 59.12.030, et seq., the case
of Jeffries v. Spencer6 makes it clear that he must serve the notices
required by that act, and that provisions in the lease taking away from
the tenant the benefit of those notice provisions will not be given
effect. In that case the lease provided that on default in payment of
rent for thirty days after due the lessors might reenter and at their
option terminate the lease. The court rejected the landlord's con-
tention that this provision rendered the statutory notices unnecessary
for the maintenance of an unlawful detainer proceeding for default in
rent and the commission of waste. It said,6" "The appellants over-
look the plain fact that the summary action for unlawful detainer is
only accorded after three days' notice either to quit or pay rent or to
quit absolutely, according to the nature of the default. It is no hard-
ship to require the giving of the statutory notice as a condition prece-
dent to invoking the benefit of the statutory remedy. In the case
before us, the plaintiffs seek to terminate the lease both for the failure
to pay rent and because of the commission of waste. To maintain the
action, either form of notice would have been sufficient, but it is
admitted that neither was given. The notice being a statutory pre-
requisite to the invocation of the statutory remedy, the action was
properly dismissed."
Where the provision in the lease accords the tenant greater protec-
tion than that offered by the notice provisions of the unlawful detainer
statute, there can be little doubt that the parties had in mind the
unlawful detainer statute and intended such a provision to supplant
the statutory notice period. There is no such conflict with the policy
of the act, and the landlord must comply with the lease provisions."'
62 Cf. Petsch v. Williams, supra, note 12.
63 Spencer v. Commercial Co., 30 Wash. 520, 71 Pac. 53 (1902).
64 86 Wash. 133, 149 Pac. 651 (1915) ; cf. Thisius v. Sealander, 26 Wn.2d 810, 818,
175 P2d 619 (1946).65 86 Wash. at 136.
66 Income Properties Inv. Corp. v. Trefethen, 155 Wash. 493, 501-502, 284 Pac.




The foregoing discussion suggests that, as a matter of precaution
but not necessarily as the rules to be applied in litigation, the follow-
ing practices be observed in connection with landlord and tenant
notices:
1. Notices should always be in writing.
2. The notice should state the date upon which the tenancy will be
terminated.
3. The notice should be served so that, excluding the date of service,
the statutory periods and any periods required by the lease will remain
before the date of the termination of the tenancy and the commence-
ment of an action.
4. The notice should contain an adequate description of the prem-
ises involved, preferably both the legal description and any common
description known to the parties to the tenancy.
5. Notices to pay rent or surrender should state the exact amount
of the defaulted rent.
6. Notices to perform conditions or covenants or surrender the
premises should state in detail the facts constituting the breach of
the condition or covenant so that the tenant may know exactly what
he might do to avoid a forfeiture of the lease.
7. The same detail should be inserted in notices to vacate for the
commission of waste.
8. The notice should make reference to the portion of the statute
under which it is given.
9. Notices should be signed by the landlord or in the landlord's
name by an agent, and not in the agent's name.
10. Where husband and wife are involved as parties to the tenancy,
both should sign the notice, or the signature should be in the names
of both by an agent.
11. The provisions of RCW 59.12.040 regarding service of notices
should be followed exactly and without deviation, and, if a husband
and wife are parties to the lease, copies of the notice should be served
on both.
12. No reliance should be placed on notice provisions in the lease
if they afford the tenant less protection than the unlawful detainer
statute, though they should be followed if they grant the tenant greater
protection.
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